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Pushed into Pragmatism: 
British Approaches to Science in Post-War Occupied Germany 
Dr Charlie Hall 
(University of Kent) 
ABSTRACT 
One of the most important dilemmas facing the British authorities when they 
occupied their zone of Germany at the end of the Second World War was what to 
do with German science. The contributions made by scientists and engineers to the 
Nazi war machine, in fields such as rocketry and submarines, meant that German 
science was both revered and feared, and was therefore closely linked to concerns 
about a post-war military resurgence in Germany. This article aims to chart the 
changing approaches which the British occupation officials adopted towards 
German science in this period. While the initial intention was to prevent Germany 
from ever waging war again, through demilitarisation, denazification and 
dismantling, the focus changed as British enmity shifted from a former adversary, 
Germany, to a former ally, the Soviet Union. Policy reflected this shift as technology 
transfer and the reconstruction of domestic German science won greater favour. 
This article aims to show that, in the face of growing hostility from the USSR and in 
the deeply suspicious climate of the early Cold War, Britain was forced to abandon 
its moral mission towards German science and adopt a far more pragmatic strategy 
instead. 
KEYWORDS: British occupation, post-war Germany, science policies, Cold War, reconstruction 
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Pushed into Pragmatism: 
British Approaches to Science in Post-War Occupied Germany 
Dr Charlie Hall 
(University of Kent) 
Despite the totality of Germany͛s defeat in 1945, the British impression of German science at 
the end of the “eĐoŶd Woƌld Waƌ ǁas that it ǁas ǀastlǇ supeƌioƌ to BƌitaiŶ͛s oǁŶ. 
Though the peƌĐeptioŶs of the Thiƌd ‘eiĐh͛s teĐhŶologiĐal supeƌioƌitǇ ǁeƌe greatly 
exaggerated, and had a minimal impact on the course of the war, theƌe is Ŷo douďt that 
GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s aƌseŶal ĐoŶtaiŶed ŵuĐh which was better or more advanced than that in the Allied 
armouries.1 This belief in turn gave rise to a characterisation of the German war machine as 
vast, unthinking, soulless and ruthlessly destructive but with a strong foundation in cutting-
edge science.2 In a report from the Economic and Industrial Planning Staff, one of the 
numerous British bodies tasked with preparing for the post-war period, the Nazi regime was 
described as having successfully dedicated ͚every aspect of scientific activity … to waging war͛. 
The report went on to argue that Germany was ͚perhaps the only nation who carried the 
prostitution of science to this extremity͛.3 This gives a clear indication of the way in which British 
officials, many of whom had no scientific background or expertise, conceived of and defined 
science in this period, particularly under the Third Reich. In their minds, German science, ŵeaŶiŶg 
ŵaiŶlǇ ͚ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd deǀelopŵeŶt͛, was one of two things – either a blunt instrument wielded by 
the Nazis to aid their military efforts and industrial output, or an island of scholarly non-
conformity within the regime. This dichotomous, even contradictory, understanding, 
stripped of all nuance, goes some way to explaining the approaches the British occupation 
authorities took to science – for example, as David Cassidy has argued, for many officials, the 
important distinction between pure and applied science ceased to matter during discussions on 
this topic.4 Throughout this article, therefore, the term science is represented in a form 
which, though oversimplified, would be familiar to the contemporary actors.  
The British attitude towards science was very much in alignment with the main initial 
thrust of occupation policy – that is, to ensure Germany was never again in a position to wage war 
against Britain or its allies.5 This, coupled with the desire to extract reparations for the 
considerable financial cost of waging the war, led to the programme of exploitation – of 
German science, as well as of industry and of various other human resources – which 
maintained a prominent place in British occupation policy throughout the post-war period, 
and is critical to understanding approaches to German science. These motivations, however, 
were not totally fixed or 
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static and the enormous expenses of the occupation– unmet by exploitation or other reparations 
schemes - soon generated a desire to return Germany to a position of economic viability and self-
sufficiency. Moreover, before long, the Soviet Union had replaced Germany as the most serious 
thƌeat to BƌitaiŶ͛s seĐuƌitǇ, aŶd it ďeĐaŵe appaƌeŶt that GeƌŵaŶǇ ŵight iŶ faĐt ďe stƌategiĐallǇ 
valuable in the defence against this new menace.6 
The aim of this article is to show that although the British Ŷeǀeƌ settled oŶ a foƌŵal ͚sĐieŶĐe 
poliĐǇ͛ with respect to Germany – indeed such a policy would have been alien to British politicians 
and civil servants alike in 1945 – their approaches towards German science after the Second World 
War largely followed the broader trends of occupation policy, though often in sharper relief. As such, 
while they were initially guided by principles of retribution, censure and, to a lesser extent, morality, 
expediency came to be the dominant element in decision-making on this matter. In studying British 
approaches to science as a microcosm, or case study, of occupation policy, it is clear that the 
relevant authorities were pushed into pragmatism not only by the prohibitively high cost of an 
occupation which deliberately restricted any German efforts towards economic independence, but 
also by the increasing fear of the USSR and the fact that a strong, pro-Western Germany was seen as 
necessary to resist Soviet hostility. 
Along with presenting the first account and explanation of this hitherto unexplored aspect of 
British post-war occupation policy, this article has three broader goals. The first is to contribute a 
new facet to the historical appraisal of the occupation of Germany, complementing the growth of 
recent scholarship which deals with other specific elements, such as public health, prosecution of 
war crimes and the refugee crisis.7 The unprecedented mass mobilisation of the Second World War 
meant that, at its conclusion, the victorious powers had to secure peace and impose their vision of 
the future not only at a government level but across German society, including in science.8 The 
second is to ƌedƌess the sĐholaƌlǇ ŶegleĐt of BƌitaiŶ͛s ƌole iŶ the oĐĐupatioŶ, oǀeƌshadoǁed as it so 
often is by the actions of its larger allies, the United States and the Soviet Union.9 This imbalance is 
evident in discussions of policy towards German science,10 and Michael Neufeld has urged a more 
global and transnational approach to, for example, the experiences of German scientists in the 
aftermath of the war, away from the traditional US-led ͚ďƌaiŶ dƌaiŶ͛ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe.11 The third goal is to 
re-evaluate the motives behind British occupation policy, and to move beyond the simple contrast of 
retribution versus reconstruction. The existing historiography on this topic is relatively sparse (some 
of it remaining sadly unpublished) but it is clear that a range of issues, including early Cold War 
hostilities, post-war British financial strife, and the desire to ƌeďuild a ͚ďetteƌ͛ GeƌŵaŶǇ aŶd Europe, 
all figured in occupation policy development. Ultimately, the British approach was generally 
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characterised by strong ideals and anti-German sentiment watered down by the practicalities 
of occupation.12 As Christopher Knowles illustrates, while moral imperatives did have their place in 
the public discourse about how to handle Germany after the war,13 the vicissitudes of the post-
war era meant that priorities and policies were usually governed, in the end, by pragmatism. This 
article will demonstrate this by showing the evolution of the British handling of German 
science, which underwent restriction, denazification, exploitation and reconstruction – 
approaches that were separate but overlapping, and which each enjoyed a period of favour and 
dominance, depending on ĐhaŶgiŶg ĐoŶditioŶs aŶd a pƌagŵatiĐ ƌeadiŶg of ǁhiĐh ǁould ďest seƌǀe 
BƌitaiŶ͛s ĐuƌƌeŶt iŶteƌests. 
Restriction and Demilitarisation 
For the entire duration of the Third Reich, and especially during the Second World War, science 
in Germany was closely directed by the state, and this oversight even extended into semi-
autonomous organisations such as the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Society. As indicated above, Nazi 
Germany excelled at mobilising its scientific resources, both material and human, and, whether 
the focus was on new weapons, such as rockets or atomic bombs, or on less obviously 
military topics, such as synthetic rubber production or agricultural techniques, much of this 
research was geared towards aidiŶg GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ǁaƌ effoƌt.14 As such, almost immediately after 
the end of the war, the control of German science became an important topic, not just within 
the civil service in Britain but at the uppermost levels of government too. In the House of 
Lords on 29 May 1945, Baron Robert Vansittart, in one of many diatribes advocating harsh 
treatment of post-war Germany, bemoaned how inadequate British responses to German 
advances in military technology had been during both the First and Second World Wars. He 
complained that the only remedy which had been found to the threat of the V-weapons had been 
to overrun the launch sites – ͚the aŶsǁeƌ of iŶfaŶtƌǇ aŶd Ŷot of sĐieŶĐe͛ – and warned that, as 
the range of long-distance weapons increased, such a solution would not always be available. 
From this, and coloured deeply by his personal anti-German prejudices, he suƌŵised that ͚in 
dealing with a nation that is periodically homicidal, I think no precaution is excessive͛.15 
Others shared these extreme sentiments – Lady Apsley, Conservative Member of 
Parliament for Bristol Central, suggested as early as September 1944 that the German people 
should ďe left oŶlǇ to ͚the study of the higher humanities such as architectuƌe aŶd otheƌ peaĐeful 
puƌsuits͛, and that their scientists should be distributed across the countries of the United Nations 
to continue their research under supervision in laboratories there.16 These opinions were, 
however, in the minority, at least among the educated and those in a position to actually 
influence policy. 
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In April 1945, in an article in the Daily Worker, the eminent British geneticist, J.B.S. Haldane, 
wrote that he disagreed with such castigatory schemes on three grounds:  fiƌstlǇ, ďeĐause ͚a great 
deal of German research, even in the last 12 years, has been of benefit to the whole of huŵaŶitǇ͛; 
secondly, Haldane hoped that ͚the GeƌŵaŶs ǁill ultiŵatelǇ take their place among the civilised 
peoples͛ aŶd ďelieǀed they could not do this ͚without intellectual culture, which includes science͛ – 
as an example, he cited biological education as ŶeĐessaƌǇ to shoǁ the ͚utteƌ falsitǇ of Hitleƌ͛s ƌaĐial 
theoƌies͛; aŶd thiƌdlǇ, because of the length of time which it takes to put a discovery in fundamental 
science into practice, meaning that pure research itself posed no particular threat. Ultimately, 
Haldane felt that the banning of certain types of applied science, the requirement of having a license 
for any research, and periodic inspections of facilities, without forewarning, would suffice to control 
German science.17 Joseph Kenworthy, Baron Strabolgi, shaƌed HaldaŶe͛s view and dismissed more 
restrictive suggestioŶs as iŵpƌaĐtiĐaďle aŶd ͚as UtopiaŶ as the Morgenthau plan for confining 
GeƌŵaŶǇ to agƌiĐultuƌe aŶd pastoƌal puƌsuits͛, ŶotiŶg, hoǁeǀeƌ, that theƌe ǁas Ŷo ƌeasoŶ ͚ǁhǇ ǁe 
should not keep aŶ eǇe oŶ theŵ aŶd ĐoŶtƌol theŵ͛.18 Indeed, even BaƌoŶ VaŶsittaƌt͛s pƌoposed 
precautions were remarkably moderate – he suggested establishing an inter-Allied committee of 
sĐieŶtists, ǁhose ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ it ǁould ďe to ͚eǆaŵiŶe aŶd ĐoŶtƌol, aŶd if ŶeĐessary to prohibit the 
use by Germany of, any scientific discovery or invention considered dangerous to the safety of 
ŵaŶkiŶd͛.19 It was this outlook which formed the basis of policy, at least initially, mirroring similar 
strategies regarding other areas of German life, such as education.20 As such, a plethora of 
committees and agencies were established by the British to develop and enforce these 
comparatively rational measures of scientific control. 
The German Science and Industry Committee (GSIC) had been appointed in August 1944 to 
consider questions both of scientific control and industrial disarmament. They acknowledged the 
close link between industry and war potential, and recommended a policy of constant watchfulness 
to ensure no new research areas with military connotations were permitted to arise.21 The Scientific 
and Technical Intelligence Branch (STIB) operated much like a conventional intelligence agency, 
gathering information on all scientific and technical research taking place within the British Zone, 
particularly where it related to warlike developments.22 The Scientific Committee for Germany was a 
consultative body, comprising senior British experts from across the spectrum of scientific fields, and 
tasked ǁith adǀisiŶg the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt oŶ ͚all questions relating to German scientific and technical 
development in the British Zone͛, espeĐiallǇ those of ͚potential military importance͛.23 Lastly, the 
Research Branch of the Control Commission for Germany (CCG) had arguably the most challenging 
task, as they were charged not only with monitoring any potentially dangerous German scientific 
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research, but also with preventing too many German scientists leaving the British Zone (especially 
for Soviet employment).24  
The largest and most far-reaching development in the control of science came in April 1946 
when, as part of a raft of measures designed to codify the central tenets of the occupation and to 
co-ordinate policy throughout the four zones of Germany, the Allied Control Council (comprised of 
British, French, American and Soviet representatives) passed Laǁ No.Ϯϱ, eŶtitled ͚CoŶtƌol of 
“ĐieŶtifiĐ ‘eseaƌĐh͛. This laǁ foƌďade aŶǇ applied oƌ fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌeseaƌĐh ͚of a wholly or primarily 
military nature͛, as ǁell as aŶǇ ŶoŶ-warlike research which would require the use of facilities or 
iŶstallatioŶs ǁhiĐh, ͚on account of their size or their special or peculiar construction͛, Đould also ďe 
used for military research. Even scientific research which was not prohibited under the above 
measures could only be conducted in facilities which were given the explicit approval of the Zone 
Commander.25 Completely banned subjects included aerodynamics, aircraft design and ship 
construction, while those which required prior permission included electromagnetic, infrared and 
acoustic radiation research. The effect of Law No. 25 was to seriously limit German scientific 
eŶdeaǀouƌ aŶd as suĐh it also seǀeƌelǇ thƌeateŶed GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s aďilitǇ to ƌeĐoǀeƌ eĐoŶoŵiĐallǇ.26 
As a result, thinking on this subject began to change. At the end of April, as Law No. 25 was 
promulgated, Research Branch began to adǀoĐate a ͚conception of control͛ which was not ͚merely 
the negative one of preventing the Germans from doing undesirable things͛ ďut also takiŶg ͚positive 
action to provide conditions in which German research can develop along the right line͛. Indeed, this 
was not entirely a new idea. In September 1945, both the Deputy Chiefs of Staff and the GSIC 
adǀaŶĐed the ǀieǁ that a ͚purely restrictive policy will not achieve the desired ends͛ aŶd ǁould likely 
Đƌeate ͚conditions of unrest and rancour͛ aŵoŶg the sĐieŶtifiĐ ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ – a sector of the German 
population which the occupying officials were most keen to encourage. Their report continued that 
although theƌe should ďe ͚important measures of prohibition, limitation and control in certain fields 
which may have a military significance, there should be no restriction of German scientific activity 
for peaceful ends͛.27 This was in alignment with British policy on education – while the occupation 
authorities acknowledged the extent to which it had been poisoned by Nazi ideology, they also saw 
its revival as essential to the restoration of peace and democracy in Germany.28 
This more reasonable approach tended to prevail and, as a result, the harsher, stricter 
elements of policy were accompanied by more positive and conciliatory tactics, which sought to 
rehabilitate German science and incorporate it back into the global community. One proposed 
scheme along these lines was to place research contracts from British government departments and 
private industry with German firms. In November 1946, the secretary of the Scientific Committee for 
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Germany, D.A. Johnston eǆpouŶded the ďeŶefits of this plaŶ, aƌguiŶg that it ǁould ͚help us to keep 
German scientific activity out of subversive channels and will promote good morale and a healthy 
internationalism among German scientists͛. Continuing, he expressed his belief that although the 
pƌogƌaŵŵe ǁas diĐtated ďǇ politiĐal ĐoŶsideƌatioŶs, ͚this step towards co-ordinating German with 
British research and towards harnessing German scientific resources to British technical progress͛ 
seeŵed to ďe ͚thoroughly good and worthwhile in itself͛.29 
The control of science, whether approached with a punitive or conciliatory attitude, was also 
affected by the wider scheme to disarm and demilitarise Germany. In simple terms, this 
eŶĐoŵpassed the ƌeduĐtioŶ of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ǁaƌ poteŶtial to a positioŶ ǁheƌe it would no longer be 
able to conduct an aggressive military campaign. The clearest manifestation of this policy was the 
ƌeŵoǀal of ͚ǁaƌ ŵateƌial͛, defiŶed as ͚any material of whatever nature and wherever situated, 
intended for war on land, at sea, or in the air, or which is or may be or has been at any time in use 
by, or inteŶded foƌ use ďǇ, the aƌŵed foƌĐes, Điǀil defeŶĐe, oƌ otheƌ foƌŵatioŶs oƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶs.͛30 
Of course, weapons and ammunition were confiscated swiftly and effectively by the invading Allied 
forces and then by the early occupation troops; while other, less dangerous military material, such 
as clothing, shoes, soap and tools, were provided to Displaced Persons via humanitarian agencies 
and were later sold to the German people as the domestic economy was revived.31 The larger and 
more complicated issue was industrial disarmament, wherein it was necessary to remove from 
Germany the means to develop or manufacture any implements of war, which therefore included 
military-oriented laboratories and research and development facilities. 
An official policy statement on German industrial disarmament, approved by the Cabinet on 
13 September 1945, noted that it offeƌed gƌeat ǀalue ďǇ ͚leŶgtheŶiŶg the tiŵe ďetǁeeŶ the staƌt aŶd 
the fƌuitioŶ of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌeaƌŵaŵeŶt, so that aĐtioŶ ĐaŶ ďe takeŶ at oŶĐe to pƌeǀeŶt it ǁith little 
Đost to ouƌselǀes͛. There were three alternative methods available for dealing with military factories 
and laboratories: one, to remove general purpose plant and destroy the buildings; two, to declare 
the plant available for reparations; or three, to convert it to civil use.32 Generally speaking, it was the 
second option, that of dismantling the plant and apportioning its valuable parts among the nations 
owed reparations, which became the most commonplace. This was largely because it offered a 
compromise which allowed Germany to remain at least somewhat economically viable and thus in a 
position to provide reparations, while also removing material which could later pose a threat to the 
security of the Allies.33 This is not to say that dismantling was a wholly popular scheme, or that it was 
simple. In fact it faced many difficulties, not least the problem of public opinion in Germany, which 
became increasingly vocal and critical of punitive measures imposed by the occupiers, and could 
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take the foƌŵ of ͚go-sloǁ͛ taĐtiĐs oƌ eǀeŶ oƌgaŶised ƌesistaŶĐe aŶd saďotage.34 The British had to 
handle this on a larger scale than the other occupiers because the rich industrial heartland of the 
‘uhƌ, ǁhiĐh ĐoŶtaiŶed so ŵaŶǇ of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s faĐtoƌies aŶd plaŶts, laǇ ǁithiŶ the British Zone. 
Beyond this, the occupation authorities were also concerned, as they were throughout the initial 
post-war period, with striking the balance between weakening Germany as a potential aggressor 
while still building an economy which allowed for a decent standard of living.35 
This dilemma can be clearly seen in the handling of the colossal and technologically-
advanced German conglomerate, IG Farben, which had strong links with the Nazi regime and had 
indeed profited from the use of concentration camp slave labour in its factories. It was considered of 
such great importance that all four occupying powers set up a quadripartite commission to 
investigate its activities, and while the IG was formally liquidated, many of its constituent parts were 
allowed to live on under new identities and many of its directors were rehabilitated, even after they 
were found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity by Allied courts.36 Overall, industrial 
disarmament strategies had a very direct bearing on British approaches to German science, which 
was seen as both the source of perhaps the most significant threat which Germany could offer in its 
comprehensively defeated condition, and, through its close connections with industry and business, 
as haǀiŶg aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌole to plaǇ iŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s eĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌehaďilitation. If, however, German 
science was going to be in a position to contribute towards the rebuilding of a strong, prosperous 
and diplomatically stable nation, all traces of the Nazi regime had to be purged from within it.  
Denazification 
This ideological purge took the form of comprehensive policies of denazification, pursued by all four 
Allies during the period of occupation, and designed to remove what was seen as a toxic political 
influence from all spheres of German life. This encompassed many different activities, such as the 
demolition of monuments to the Third Reich and the changing of street names which glorified 
prominent Nazis, but its main focus was directed towards people. Generally speaking, this entailed 
removing individuals tainted by a Nazi past from any positions of authority – teachers, civil servants, 
lawyers and so on – as well as attempting a widespread programme of re-education, ostensibly to 
show the German people what was wrong with Nazi ideology and prepare them for a peaceful 
democratic future.37 Unsurprisingly, every aspect of denazification, from the basic premise to the 
practicalities of implementation, was a source of some controversy and the debate over both its 
validity as a concept and its effectiveness has been engaged in as thoroughly in historical literature 
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as it was among contemporary observers.38 Of particular note is the fact that the British soon 
developed a reputation for having a lenient attitude towards denazification, in part because they 
believed low-ranking ex-Nazis would be more amenable to taking orders from the occupiers than 
other political denominations, such as communists.39 It has been convincingly argued that this 
appƌoaĐh ǁas iŶspiƌed, iŶ Ŷo sŵall paƌt, ďǇ BƌitaiŶ͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe as aŶ iŵpeƌial poǁeƌ, wherein local 
elites, who had sometimes previously fought against them, were relied upon to maintain law and 
order, provide intelligence and handle lower-level administration in the colonies.40  
One problem, which plagued the entire process of denazification, was assessing, or defining, 
who exactly constituted a Nazi.41 The denazification of German science was no exception and the 
overriding question for the occupation authorities was to what extent German scientists were 
actually implicated in the crimes of the Third Reich. Despite the multiple contributions which the 
scientific community had made to the German war effort, there was a widespread belief that most 
German scientists had not supported Nazism, or had in some cases directly opposed it. In September 
1946, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff voiced the opinion that denazification of science would hardly be 
ŶeĐessaƌǇ as ͚fƌoŵ a politiĐal poiŶt of ǀieǁ the ƌeĐoƌds of sĐieŶtists as a Đlass ǁeƌe ƌeasoŶaďlǇ 
good͛42. The US National Academy of the Sciences took this even further, believing that the scientific 
community had withdrawn into their ivory tower during the Third Reich and thus composed an 
͚islaŶd of ŶoŶ-ĐoŶfoƌŵitǇ͛ ǁithiŶ the ƌegiŵe.43 Others preferred to view the situation in more 
abstract terms – scientists, especially physicists, were to be seen as little more than tools, and tools 
could not be Nazified or denazified.44 This was indicative of a wider re-evaluation of the moral 
leadership and institutional governance of modern science, taking place in Britain and elsewhere and 
sparked by the complex entanglement of science and state during the Second World War.45 This 
uncertainty and introspection translated into practical action, or the distinct lack of it. The Kaiser 
Wilhelm Society (KWS; later rebranded as the Max Planck Society), for instance, was left to largely 
denazify itself, which led to it further promoting the view that all German scientists had either 
resisted the Nazi regime or were victims of it.46 
This is not as disingenuous as it may at first appear. There were many examples of German 
scientists who genuinely did Ŷot ͚succumb to the temptation and threat of tyranny͛ aŶd pƌessuƌe 
was exerted, frequently by their peers in Britain or the USA, to rescue these men from the 
destitution which often befell them following the end of the war and the subsequent ban on much 
scientific research. Among these was Otto Heubner, a professor of pharmacology from Berlin who 
had ended up living in a poor situation in Hamburg after the war. An old colleague of his, Otto 
Krayer, who had fled the Nazis and had become a professor of pharmacology at Harvard, wrote to Sir 
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Henry Dale, a fellow pharmacologist and outgoing President of the Royal Society, and asked for 
assistance to be rendered to Heubner, describing him as ͚a representative of the spiritual and 
intellectual forces, who, if saved from a miserable fate, can be valuable in the restoration in the all-
embracing community of science͛47. Dale shaƌed KƌaǇeƌ͛s assessŵeŶt aŶd, iŶ passiŶg the ƌeƋuest foƌ 
aid on to the ƌeleǀaŶt adŵiŶistƌatiǀe ďodies, ƌeŵaƌked hoǁ ͚Heubner and his wife, in fact, both 
trailed their coats to the Nazis͛, such as by refusing to give the Hitler salute at the beginning of 
lectures, ͚and somehow were left unmolested.͛48 These appeals obviously had the desired effect as, 
in March 1946, after almost six months of the case being passed through bureaucratic channels, 
Heubner was offered a Chair at the University of Bonn.  
Not all scientists from the Allied countries were so quick to render support and assistance to 
their German peers, and not all held the view that science had largely been exempt from the horrors 
of the Nazi regime. In December 1947, in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Philip Morrison, 
professor of physics at Cornell University, provided a damning indictment of German science, in 
which he did not question their implication in Nazi crimes: 
… no different from their Allied counterparts, the German scientists worked for the military as best 
their circumstances allowed. But the difference, which it will never be possible to forgive, is that they 
worked for the cause of Himmler and Auschwitz, for the burners of books and the takers of hostages. 
The community of science will be long delayed in welcoming the armorers of the Nazis, even if their 
work was not successful.49 
In April 1948, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists puďlished a ƌeplǇ to MoƌƌisoŶ͛s article, from Max von 
Laue, the atomic physicist to whom Morrison had referred by name in his piece as one scientist who 
resisted the Nazis. Von Laue refuted the ͚ŵoŶstƌous suggestioŶ͛ that GeƌŵaŶ sĐieŶĐe as a ďodǇ 
worked for Himmler and Auschwitz and attempted to explain how, in the Third Reich, basic 
compliance with the Nazi authorities allowed for smaller acts of non-conformity, such as preventing 
young scientific workers from being called up for frontline military service. Overall, von Laue tried to 
illustƌate ͚hoǁ Đaƌeful oŶe ŵust ďe iŶ passiŶg judgeŵeŶt oŶ eǀeŶts ǁhiĐh took plaĐe uŶdeƌ a 
tǇƌaŶŶǇ͛ aŶd ǁith this iŶ ŵiŶd, it is Đleaƌ hoǁ diffiĐult deŶazifiĐatioŶ of science was to apply, as the 
distinctions between co-operation with, and opposition to, the Nazi regime were so malleable and 
indistinct.50  
Nevertheless, the Allies did enact a programme of denazification within German science and 
the core principles of this were laid out under Control Council Law No.25, in a clause which stated:  
Senior officials oƌ sĐieŶtists ǁho ǁeƌe ŵeŵďeƌs of the NatioŶal “oĐialist GeƌŵaŶ Woƌkeƌs͛ PaƌtǇ 
(NSDAP) or members of other Nazi organisations with more than nominal participation in its activities 
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shall be removed and their replacement effected only by persons with suitable political records. 
Scientific work in general or on the development of weapons in the past shall not, in itself, be 
regarded as ground for dismissal or other punishment.51 
In terms of execution, the denazification of science can be seen to go through four stages, beginning 
with the initial arrests of scientists and confiscation of their materials; followed by summary 
disŵissals oƌ eŶfoƌĐed ͚self-ĐleaŶsiŶg͛ opeƌatioŶs; theŶ ďǇ the haŶdiŶg oǀeƌ of the geŶeƌal 
administration of denazification to German officials, with only minimal Allied oversight; and finally, 
the eŶd of the pƌoĐess, aŶd the gƌadual ƌeaďsoƌptioŶ of ͚sŵall-fƌǇ͛ Nazis aŶd Đollaďoƌatoƌs back into 
academic and scientific life.52 This ǁas faƌ fƌoŵ aŶ ideal pƌoĐeduƌe, espeĐiallǇ iŶ teƌŵs of ͚self-
ĐleaŶsiŶg͛ iŶitiatiǀes, suĐh as that ĐoŶduĐted ďǇ the Kaiseƌ Wilhelŵ “oĐietǇ, ǁhiĐh, as ǁe haǀe seeŶ, 
ǁas Ŷot espeĐiallǇ thoƌough. Caƌola “aĐhse aƌgues that the KW“ used ͚the political ignorance of the 
scientific actors as an excuse for the indisputable amoral demarcation of scientific practice͛ aŶd 
puƌsued ͚a policy of obscuration, extenuation, and reinterpretation͛.53 
Generally speaking, the British had a reputation for clemency and many Germans with 
dubious pasts travelled to the British zone, especially from the American zone, to avoid harsher 
punishment.54 Nonetheless, across the British zone, denazification measures were criticised for 
punishing individuals whose co-operation Britain sought in the rebuilding of a healthy, prosperous 
and democratic Germany as well as more generally damaging the relationship between occupiers 
and occupied.55 Indeed, in January 1947, when the Scientific Committee for Germany registered its 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶ that ͚serious anomalies had occurred in the denazification of German scientists͛, their fear 
was not that politically tainted scientists were escaping punishment, but rather that the judgements 
passed on them were too severe, therefore hampering British recruitment of these men, or making 
them inaccessible altogether.56 The situation was further compounded by the growing competition 
ǁith the ‘ussiaŶs foƌ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s sĐieŶtifiĐ ƌesouƌĐes, as evidenced by remarks made by the director 
of Research Branch, Bertie Blount – ͚how successful our denazification policy, as carried out by the 
clever young men of Intelligence Division, is being in driving ability and intelligence into the ranks of 
ouƌ eŶeŵies͛. He even accused the men of Intelligence Division of being socialists who saw a 
GeƌŵaŶ sĐieŶtist͛s dislike of ‘ussia aŶd Đlose aĐƋuaiŶtaŶĐe ǁith ͚laŶded pƌopƌietoƌs aŶd ďig ďusiŶess 
ŵeŶ͛ as evidence of his political criminality and thus suitable grounds for his punishment under 
denazification laws.57  
Others shaƌed BlouŶt͛s dismay that Britain might suffer, to the benefit of their former ally, as 
a result of their commitment to denazification. Herbert Cremer, a chemical engineer and member of 
the “ĐieŶtifiĐ Coŵŵittee foƌ GeƌŵaŶǇ, ĐoŶsideƌed it the ͚height of follǇ͛ that by BƌitaiŶ͛s ͚literal 
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adherence to the [inter-Allied] denazification agreement, we should be helping to drive German 
scientists into the hands of the Russians, who themselves treated the same agreement with 
Đoŵplete ĐǇŶiĐisŵ.͛58 It is faiƌ to saǇ that this ͚liteƌal adheƌeŶĐe͛ ǁas Ŷot espeĐiallǇ eǀideŶt iŶ the 
Bƌitish zoŶe ďut Cƌeŵeƌ͛s ĐoŵŵeŶts ƌeǀeal that the ǀeƌǇ idea of it ǁas seeŶ as iŶiŵiĐal to Bƌitish 
interests. Alongside this criticism from the British authorities, denazification also faced increasing 
opposition from the German public during this period, even to the extent of active protest from 
certain sectors of society, such as the Protestant churches.59 
However, domestic German protest was not the main reason for the disappearance of 
denazification of science from the British agenda. It was, rather, one of the first victims of the 
triumph of pragmatism and expediency over the moral missions with which the occupation 
authorities had initially been charged. Though it may have been nobly intended, it ran counter to the 
main objectives of the British occupation – to ƌestoƌe GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s eĐoŶoŵiĐ self-sufficiency and to 
build up defences against potential future aggression from the Soviet Union – and this spelled its 
demise. By 1948, there had been a significant shift iŶ the peƌĐeptioŶ of the ͚ƌelatiǀe daŶgeƌ of 
Nazisŵ aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶisŵ͛, ǁhiĐh ǁas ƌefleĐted iŶ gƌeateƌ leŶieŶĐǇ iŶ deŶazifiĐatioŶ pƌoĐeediŶgs aŶd 
in their ultimate termination, long before the work which they had set out to do had been 
completed.60 The British were not the only occupier to alter their policy in this way; a similar 
reconfiguration took place in the American zone too.61 While this change in attitudes contributed to 
deŶazifiĐatioŶ͛s deepeŶiŶg uŶpopulaƌitǇ, it simultaneously added much greater support to 
alternative policies being enacted by the British in post-war Germany, such as the exploitation of 
scientific resources and the quest for reparations, both of which came with the added benefit of 
providing Britain with direct material gain. These shifting priorities are perhaps best illustrated by a 
statement made in the House of Lords on 12 March 1946, by the Lord Chancellor, William Jowitt, in 
response to criticism of the employment of politically questionable German experts in Britain. He 
declared ͚I am willing to risk their being Nazis – and I think they probably are – so long as they are 
highly skilled technicians who will teach our people something which they did not previously 
know.͛62 
Exploitation and Reparations 
As Joǁitt͛s deĐlaƌatioŶ suggests, along with the desire to denazify Germany and prevent another 
global conflict, there was also a wish to profit from Germany in order to offset some of the costs 
incurred by the Allies in their fight against the Third Reich, and during the post-war occupation. 
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Unsurprisingly, on the topic of reparations, the problematic experiences in the aftermath of the First 
World War loomed large in the consciousness of policy-makers. Not only had the reparations 
demands agreed upon at Versailles in 1919 proved deeply impractical and ultimately unobtainable, 
they had also contributed to the myth of betrayal and foreign suppression which Hitler and the Nazi 
Party had capitalised on in their rise to power during the 1920s and 1930s. As a result, the Allied 
authorities were keen to avoid a repeat of these mistakes following the Second World War; an issue 
which was further compounded by the difference between the situations in which Germany found 
itself after the two wars. Whereas in 1918, Germany was still a sovereign nation with only small 
parts of its territory occupied and with an economy that was weakened but still generally functional, 
in 1945, the whole country was under foreign occupation and a combination of intense Allied 
bombing, bitter ground combat, and Hitleƌ͛s sĐoƌĐhed eaƌth poliĐǇ had ƌeduĐed iŶdustƌǇ to ŵiŶiŵal 
levels of productivity. Any Allied reparations policy would have to reflect these dire conditions and 
the legacy of Versailles, as well as general hopes and expectations for the future. 
The main lesson learned from the First World War was that it was ineffective to demand 
reparations in direct financial form – instead, payment in kind was to be encouraged.63 Initially, it 
was intended that this would take the form of capital equipment, dismantled and shipped abroad, 
and this would then be followed by annual deliveries of goods from current German production.64 At 
the Potsdam Conference, which took place between the leaders of Britain, the USA and the Soviet 
Union in the summer of 1945, the USA took a leading role in negotiating an Allied reparations 
agreement. During the war, the American economy had grown enormously and issues of surplus 
rather than scarcity were anticipated for the post-war period – as such, traditional reparations, in 
the form of plant, machinery, labour, or goods, were not only uninteresting to the US but genuinely 
undesirable. However, as it had been decided that reparations were a political goal in Germany, the 
US pushed for rewards which they could actually use, including patents, processes aŶd ͚teĐhŶiĐal 
know-hoǁ of eǀeƌǇ tǇpe͛.65 Science and technology therefore figured very highly in assessments of 
valuable reparations, for the British as well as the Americans. In fact, as early as March 1944, the 
Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lieutenant-General Ronald Weeks, had predicted that 
GeƌŵaŶ ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd deǀelopŵeŶt iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ŵight ďe ͚the oŶlǇ foƌŵ of ƌepaƌatioŶ ǁhiĐh it ǁill 
be possible to exact from Germany͛.66 
Scientific and technological reparations, particularly those pertaining to military research, 
soon garnered much favour among the occupation authorities and one clear reason for this was that 
they represented something of a compromise between the potentially conflicting aims of weakening 
GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ŵilitary power and maintaining its economic viability.67 So naturally obvious were the 
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links between demilitarisation and reparations that it was felt necessary to include within the official 
British policy statement an assertion that disaƌŵaŵeŶt ŵeasuƌes ͚should be carried out regardless 
of theiƌ effeĐt oŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ĐapaĐitǇ to ŵake ƌepaƌatioŶ foƌ the daŵage she has doŶe͛.68 In short, 
reparations could contribute to demilitarisation but should always remain a secondary concern 
behind limitiŶg GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ĐapaĐitǇ to ǁage aggƌessiǀe ǁaƌ. Seizing intellectual property as 
reparations was even more problematic, not only because it was notoriously difficult to assign with 
financial value, but also because it was harder to justify on a moral or political basis. It could not be 
considered as direct restitution for losses incurred during the war nor were those most likely to 
profit from the post-war transfer of intellectual property generally the same people or groups who 
had suffered most severely during the war.69 
Further complicating matters was the fact that the reparations scheme was not the only way 
in which the British could remove what they wanted from Germany. In fact, under the occupation, 
there were three permissible ways in which material could be removed from Germany: it could be 
taken as reparations, as long as it passed through all the necessary official international channels; it 
Đould ďe paid foƌ iŶ appƌoǀed ĐuƌƌeŶĐǇ as a stƌaightfoƌǁaƌd eǆpoƌt; oƌ, if ƌegaƌded as ͚ďootǇ͛, it Đould 
be ͚removed outside the reparations pƌoĐeduƌe aŶd ǁithout paǇŵeŶt͛. Naturally, this last option 
ǁas the ŵost attƌaĐtiǀe. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the ŵateƌial iŶ ƋuestioŶ had to ƋualifǇ as ͚ďootǇ͛ foƌ this ƌoute to 
be legitimate – the giǀeŶ defiŶitioŶ of ďootǇ ǁas: ͚Aƌŵs, ŵunitions and implements of war, and all 
research and development facilities (including documents, material and training devices) relative 
theƌeto.͛ What this loosely entailed in real terms was any equipment found within German research 
establishments concerned solely with warlike subjects, as well as certain industrial items required as 
prototypes or for further examination in Britain.70 
In fact, long before any formal international reparations agreement had come into practice, 
Britain and its allies had already been conducting operations to remove information and material of 
scientific and technological value from Germany. These actions, coming under the umbrella term of 
͚eǆploitatioŶ͛, had ďeeŶ ĐoŶduĐted ďǇ Ŷuŵeƌous ageŶĐies ǁoƌkiŶg aĐƌoss ďoth GeƌŵaŶǇ and the 
formerly Nazi-occupied territories since the summer of 1944. Once the war ended, the scope 
increased dramatically as the Third Reich lay defenceless and utterly vulnerable to these 
unscrupulous removals, and the administrative framework necessary to handle this programme in 
the Allied countries grew quickly to meet the demand. All the victorious powers took part in 
exploitation, with the USA and the Soviet Union operating on the broadest scale, but with Britain 
and France both making up for their comparatively limited resources with enthusiasm, perseverance 
and considerable ingenuity.71 Unsurprisingly, exploitation operations, both on their own merit and in 
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concomitance with reparations removals, had a serious impact on British policy towards German 
science during the occupation. 
Exploitation took many forms during the post-war period and one of the most common 
involved teams of Allied experts in a certain field travelling to Germany, visiting numerous plants, 
laboratories and factories relevant to that field, examining equipment, documents and material, 
interviewing the staff, and then compiling final reports which served as a summary of progress made 
in that field in Germany since the start of the war. Initially, this approach was confined to military 
topics but was soon expanded to include those of civil industrial interest too. The work of these 
exploitation teams was often instrumental in deciding what should be taken as reparations – 
eƋuipŵeŶt aŶd doĐuŵeŶtatioŶ ǁas seeŶ to Đoŵpƌise aŶ ͚esseŶtial ĐouŶteƌpaƌt͛ to the iŶdustƌial 
intelligence gathered by these teams, and it was argued that the value of this intelligence would be 
͚seƌiouslǇ ƌeduĐed͛ ǁithout haǀiŶg ͚the phǇsiĐal ŵateƌial foƌ puƌposes of eǆpeƌiŵeŶt͛ iŶ BƌitaiŶ.72 
While the exploitation of facilities and the removals (as reparations or booty) of plant, 
machinery, or other specialised equipment comprised an important part of British policy towards 
German science, it was dwarfed by another element of exploitation – the detention, interrogation 
and ultimate recruitment of German scientists and technicians.73 Again, this extended into both the 
civilian and military spheres and was seen as a way to bring the greatest spoils of German expertise 
to Britain. It was mirrored by similar schemes to exploit the ďest aŶd ďƌightest of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ŵilitaƌǇ, 
law enforcement, and intelligence communities, though these were often smaller and more covert.74 
IŶitiallǇ, it ǁas ĐoŶsideƌed that ͚the seƌǀiĐe of these highlǇ skilled GeƌŵaŶs ďƌought oǀeƌ ďǇ 
Government Departments is national property, like the specialised plant being seized as reparations 
oƌ ďootǇ͛.75 Later, however, private firms in Britain were permitted to hire German specialists 
directly, thus contributing to the notion that the exploitation programme simply served as a vehicle 
for industrial espionage, wherein British companies could profit at the expense of their erstwhile 
German rivals.76 
Moreover, Germany as a whole suffered as a result of the loss of its brightest scientific 
minds. These experts, who were perhaps in the best position to help rebuild German science after 
the war, and restore its reputation as a thriving hub of innovation and progress, left to seek their 
fortune elsewhere. There were exceptions to this rule – for example, the esteemed nuclear 
physicists, Werner Heisenberg and Otto Hahn, both of whom had been interned in Britain 
throughout much of 1945, returned to Germany after the war.77 Hahn later became President of the 
Max Planck Society while Heisenberg became director of the Max Planck Institute for Physics, but 
not all those who stayed behind were so fortunate in their post-war career paths. Many German 
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scientists, not offered employment in one of the Allied nations and unable to work in their particular 
field in Germany due to restrictions imposed by the occupation authorities, were deeply resentful 
about their poor treatment compared with the comfortable circumstances those who had been 
exploited found themselves in. It did not help that the scientists who stayed behind felt that their 
colleagues who had gone to Britain or America were lesser minds who had simply risen to the top of 
the pile in the Third Reich thanks to opportunism  and a lack of political scruples.78 
The post-ǁaƌ ͚ďƌaiŶ dƌaiŶ͛ fƌoŵ GeƌŵaŶǇ ǁas eǆaĐeƌďated ďǇ the fierce competition which 
erupted between the Allies for the best German scientists and technicians. Even the close bonds 
which united the western occupiers (Britain, France and the United States) were put under strain by 
rival recruitment efforts, and there were examples of underhand tactics, economic muscle-flexing 
and diplomatic crises on all sides.79 It was of particular importance to the British (and Americans) 
that as few of these experts as possible ended up in Soviet hands and this gave rise to an 
unscrupulous pragmatism which triumphed blindly over alternative policies. A Joint Intelligence 
Committee report from May 1946 reveals that the British security services ǁoƌƌied that ͚the alliance 
of German brainpower and Russian resources may well prove to be the most important outcome of 
the oĐĐupatioŶ of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛ aŶd feaƌed that, ďǇ the eŶd of the Ǉeaƌ, ͚a laƌge pƌopoƌtioŶ of GeƌŵaŶ 
brainpower will have gone to the Russians and there will be no looking back͛.80 Indeed, the Soviets 
were pursuing an active exploitation scheme of their own.81 In another British intelligence report 
from August 1946, submitted by an exploitation agency on the ground in Germany, the unnamed 
author expressed his feeling that ͚ǁe ŵaǇ just as ǁell aĐkŶoǁledge the situatioŶ foƌ ǁhat it is 
between Russia and the Western powers: a completely open race for the best talent and skill 
GeƌŵaŶǇ has to offeƌ.͛82 As a result of these concerns, the British instigated what became known as 
͚deŶial poliĐǇ͛, ǁhiĐh eŶtailed seleĐtiŶg GeƌŵaŶ sĐieŶtists for recruitment in the West, not 
necessarily because they had anything to offer Britain, but simply because they were to be 
prevented from going over to the Soviets.83 
On the whole, it can be argued that many aspects of British policy on post-war German 
science can only be understood in terms of the worsening relationship with the Soviet Union.84 This 
ǁas Ŷot oŶlǇ tƌue iŶ teƌŵs of eǆploitatioŶ, ƌeĐƌuitŵeŶt aŶd ͚deŶial poliĐǇ͛, ďut also iŶ that GeƌŵaŶ 
scientists who had been recruited by the Russians but allowed to return to Germany, were often 
seized by the British intelligence services as valuable sources of information on Soviet weapons 
programmes – as Paul Maddƌell has it, ͚the fiƌst post-war penetration of Soviet military capability by 
British intelligence was a by-product of its effort to complete the victory over Germany͛.85 As has 
been shown above, denazification was an early victim to the overwhelming urge to secure the 
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services of large numbers of German specialists and thus deny them to the Soviet Union and so was, 
at least at first, any plan for the domestic reconstruction of German science. It was considered 
foolhardy and dangerous to leave any German specialist of note on German soil, almost irrespective 
of which zone of occupation he resided in, lest he be taken off to the Soviet Union and put to work 
there. However, in time, perspectives changed and, as new strategies were developed to resist any 
Soviet encroachment into Europe, the reconstruction of German science – and the rebuilding of a 
strong and prosperous German nation more widely – began to be seen as an asset rather than a 
liability. 
Reconstruction 
The defining factor of this shift in priorities was the changing appraisal of the relative threat of 
GeƌŵaŶǇ aŶd the “oǀiet UŶioŶ to Bƌitish iŶteƌests. WithiŶ a Ǉeaƌ of the ǁaƌ͛s eŶd, ŵost seŶioƌ Bƌitish 
politicians and civil servants acknowledged, in private if not yet in public, that the Soviet Union was a 
much more dangerous potential opponent than Germany. In truth, this was not a wholly new point 
of view and, even during the war when Britain and the USSR were actively collaborating as allies, 
many British intelligence and military officials, including the wartime Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, foresaw the Soviets becoming the most likely future enemy.86 As 
JuliaŶ Leǁis has ĐoŶǀiŶĐiŶglǇ put it, ͚British military planners adjusted to the looming breakdown in 
Anglo-Soviet relations with foresight, prudence and exceptional rapidity͛.87 One of the main 
outcomes of this change in perspective was that Germany all but ceased to be seen as a potential 
enemy and instead adopted a role of probable target for Soviet imperialism; this in turn meant that 
the transformation of Germany into a productive capitalist nation, which could act as a bulwark 
against communist expansion (while simultaneously defraying the considerable costs of the 
occupation), became a highly desirable outcome.88 Arguably, the British reached this conclusion 
before their American partners and expended considerable effort trying to convince the US that the 
Soviets could not be trusted and that the swift revival of the western zones of Germany was 
essential, despite the risks.89 
Nevertheless, the occupation authorities still recognised that German reconstruction needed 
to be carefully managed. In March 1946, the Allied Control Council published a plan for the level of 
the post-war German economy which listed the following as its guiding principles: 
a) Elimination of the German war potential and the industrial disarmament of Germany.
b) Payment of reparations to the countries which had suffered from German aggression.
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c) Development of agricultural and peaceful industries.
d) Maintenance in Germany of average living standards not exceeding the average standard of living of
European countries (excluding the United Kingdom and USSR).
e) Retention in Germany, after payment of reparations, of sufficient resources to enable her to maintain
herself without external assistance.
The overall intention of the plan was to effect a reduction in the level of German industry as a whole 
to a figure of about 50% of the 1938 level.90 This approach was quickly viewed as overly restrictive 
and many occupation officials on the ground simply ignored it and instead pursued a more practical 
and humane approach, following their instinct to get the country up and running again.91 This was 
reflected when the plan was revised in August 1947, as the new version acknowledged that ͚under 
present conditions Germany cannot contribute her indispensable part to the economic rehabilitation 
of Europe as a whole͛.92 
A major motive for this change in attitudes was the growing awareness that the financial 
benefit of dismantling, as advocated by proponents of both exploitation and industrial disarmament, 
was completely dwarfed by the advantages of reconstructing German industry to allow for national 
self-sufficiency.93 This reconstructive approach to industry was echoed in other fields too – by mid-
December 1945, despite the widespread structural damage and shortage of materials, all six 
universities in the British zone had reopened.94 Additionally, most British officials believed that a 
strong, profitable and educated Germany was more resistant to communism, which in their opinion 
thrived on hunger, chaos and poverty.95 Here again pragmatism had won out, as the more severe 
and punitive strategy proved unprofitable and ultimately unworkable in reality. Even so, Britain 
insisted on maintaining certain restrictions on German industry, ostensibly in the interests of 
preserving world peace but perhaps more accurately in the interests of BƌitaiŶ͛s own economic 
security and of retaining further breathing-space for British exports.96 
Although there were still lingering concerns about its possible contribution to German 
remilitarisation, generally speaking this new attitude in favour of revival extended to and included 
German science. In fact, many argued that a rehabilitated science would provide a democratising 
influence, foster educational reform and serve as a foundation for long-range economic viability, 
making it a very useful channel through which to facilitate German reconstruction.97 From a political 
angle, some even felt that the inherent rationality of science rendered it diametrically opposed to 
tyranny, which was itself inherently irrational.98 Bertie Blount of Research Branch, a firm advocate of 
reconstruction, put it thus: 
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I think it is a defensible historical thesis that revolutions are successful in so far as they are able to use 
the talent of the previous regime. We seem unable to appreciate this and, if we are not careful, the 
only long term result will be to substitute one hostile authoritarian regime in Germany for another.99 
This perspective offered a useful justification for a rehabilitation of science which was not even 
predicated on a particularly thorough expurgation of existing personnel, thus pushing denazification 
to the wayside. Moreover, the long-held scientific tradition of sharing knowledge promoted both 
openness and international co-operation; elements which were to be actively encouraged in the 
new revitalised Germany. Writing in Nature in February 1948, the Austrian-born British chemist 
Friedrich Paneth coŵŵeŶted that ͚theƌe is little sigŶ of aŶǇ ŵoƌal disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ŵeŶ of 
sĐieŶĐe iŶside aŶd outside GeƌŵaŶǇ͛ aŶd that post-war conversations between Allied scientists and 
theiƌ GeƌŵaŶ ĐouŶteƌpaƌts, usuallǇ oŶ the pƌeteǆt of eǆploitatioŶ, ͚Đould Ŷot fail to result in the 
aǁakeŶiŶg of the old spiƌit of iŶteƌŶatioŶal solidaƌitǇ so sadlǇ iŶteƌƌupted duƌiŶg the Waƌ͛. PaŶeth, 
who was of Jewish descent and had fled Germany when the Nazis came to power, also remarked 
that it ǁas ͚ǀeƌǇ pleasaŶt to see the effoƌts made by the occupying Powers to reactivate scientific life 
aŶd ƌeseaƌĐh iŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛.100 
Paneth was not alone in his favourable assessment of the revival of German science. In May 
1947, the scientific correspondent for the Daily Express, Chapman Pincher, visited the former 
aerodynamics research institute at Göttingen, the home of much of the German scientific talent to 
be found in the British zone and, despite approaching the subject with considerable cynicism, 
reported back positively. He found that ͚both the German scientists and the British officials are 
convinced that the rehabilitation of science is an essential step in the rebuilding of Germany as a 
peaceful, self-supporting State, able to pay us reparations instead of needing loans͛. He ended his 
ƌepoƌt, ǁhiĐh ǁas suggestiǀelǇ headliŶed ͚Heƌƌ Doktoƌ ;ǁith his teeth dƌaǁŶͿ is ďusǇ agaiŶ͛, ǁith the 
verdict that ͚in such an atmosphere of friendliness, enthusiasm and concentrated talent anything 
ǁould ďe possiďle͛.101 On the whole, though there were of course opponents of any reconstruction 
of German science, as seen in the first part of this article, opinion both within government circles 
and the mass media in Britain was generally in favour. Furthermore, Britain was more far-sighted in 
this approach than their American allies, who were slower to endorse German scientific 
reconstruction – indeed all reconstruction – despite entreaties for greater leniency from British 
officials at all levels.102 
One of the main reasons why British occupation authorities perceived German scientific 
ƌeǀiǀal as a positiǀe outĐoŵe ǁas the ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ it Đould ŵake to ͚deŶial poliĐǇ͛. In July 1946, the 
Scientific and Technical Research Board (STRB – who had some responsibility for exploitation and 
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recruitment in Germany) registered their concern that that many German scientists would have 
difficulty in obtaining suitable employment in the British zone and lamented that Law No. 25, on the 
CoŶtƌol of ‘eseaƌĐh, ǁhile useful iŶ ŵaŶǇ ƌespeĐts, ͚does Ŷot Đoǀer scientists and engineers who are 
out of ǁoƌk oƌ ǁho aƌe Ŷot iŶ a ƌeseaƌĐh estaďlishŵeŶt͛. It ǁeŶt oŶ: ͚These ǁill, hoǁeǀeƌ, fiŶd a 
ƌeadǇ ŵaƌket foƌ theiƌ seƌǀiĐes ǁith the ‘ussiaŶs, aŶd to a lesseƌ degƌee ǁith the FƌeŶĐh.͛103 
Elsewhere, the Admiralty worried that, although food shortages in the British zone might accelerate 
the depaƌtuƌe of GeƌŵaŶ sĐieŶtists, ͚it is doubtful whether the prospects of physical starvation 
weigh as heavily with these men as the virtual certainty of mental starvation if they remain in 
WesteƌŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛.104 Recruitment through British exploitation channels offered only a limited 
solution to the problem of unemployed German scientists drifting into Russian hands, not least 
because government research establishments and private firms in Britain could only absorb a very 
small number of these German specialists.105 
As a result, the STRB seriously considered the idea of permanently imprisoning the high-
priority experts in Germany, but eventually dismissed this as impracticable.106 Nonetheless, 
temporary detainment quickly became a critical part of British policy towards German scientists and 
technicians. Under the auspices of Operation Matchbox, for instance, a large number of German 
speĐialists aŶd theiƌ faŵilies ǁeƌe held at a ͚tƌaŶsit hotel͛ in the British zone and afforded various 
amenities, an increased ration allowance and a small stipend.107 Although conditions were 
comfortable, especially in contrast to the living arrangements of much of the German public in the 
post-war period, the scientists, ǁho ǁeƌe teƌŵed ͚ĐoŶsultaŶts͛, were expected to produce reports 
on their research but chances of real financial recompense for this work, or of long-term 
employment, were extremely slim.108 Naturally, this left ŵaŶǇ of these ŵeŶ ͚iŶteŶselǇ dissatisfied 
ǁith theiƌ lot͛ and in some cases actually increased their willingness to work for the Soviets.109 
Neither employment in Britain, nor detention in Germany, really constituted a long-term strategy to 
ensure that German experts would not end up in Soviet hands. 
Understandably, the reconstruction of German science offered a viable and attractive 
approach to tackling this issue. In December 1946, the Research Branch of the Control Commission 
stated its belief that the ŵost effeĐtiǀe stƌategǇ ǁas to giǀe ͚as ŵuĐh eŶĐouƌageŵeŶt as possiďle to 
peaceful research, and to all measures which increase the prestige of Western democratic ideals – in 
paƌtiĐulaƌ, iŶteƌĐhaŶge of sĐieŶtifiĐ ǀieǁs, aŶd iŶĐƌeased faĐilities foƌ sĐieŶtifiĐ puďliĐatioŶs͛.110 While 
still keeping to the basic premise of Law No. 25 and the restrictions on certain fields of research, 
scientific institutions in the British zone were among the first in Germany to begin functioning again, 
as evidenced perhaps most clearly by the reincarnation of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society as the Max 
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Planck Society in Göttingen in 1948.111 In addition, with the advent of the European Recovery 
Program (also known as the Marshall Plan), funds became readily available for investment in 
German science, including on certain military topics, and the German specialists now had access to 
books, periodicals and equipment, as well as scarce essentials such as accommodation, food and 
heating. This strategy paid dividends remarkably quickly – when a cross-section of the scientists 
assembled at Göttingen were surveyed in 1948, their earlier discontent had largely evaporated and 
they viewed the British and the Americans in a much more favourable light. This was largely because 
of fear of the Soviet Union, which was now seen as a dangerous threat, not a desirable alternative, 
thus ƌeŶdeƌiŶg ͚deŶial poliĐǇ͛ esseŶtiallǇ defuŶĐt.112 
However, while the risk of German specialists actively seeking better employment options in 
the USSR had effectively been neutralised, the British authorities, in concert with the Americans, 
were still concerned about the Soviets forcibly removing these experts, especially in the event of an 
iŶǀasioŶ of the ǁesteƌŶ zoŶes of GeƌŵaŶǇ. IŶ MaƌĐh ϭϵϰϵ, it ǁas ĐoŶsideƌed iŵpoƌtaŶt to ͚guard 
against the possibility of German scientists having to be left in Germany and therefore assisting an 
iŶǀadiŶg poǁeƌ͛ aŶd so a ͚ŵoďilisatioŶ plaŶ͛ ǁas dƌaǁŶ up, ǁhiĐh esseŶtiallǇ ĐoŶsisted of a 
ĐoŶtiŶuallǇ updated list of ͚GeƌŵaŶ sĐieŶtists ǁho ǁould haǀe a ƌeal ǀalue to a hostile poǁeƌ͛, ǁith 
the idea that as ŵaŶǇ as possiďle of these sĐieŶtists ǁould ďe eǀaĐuated to WesteƌŶ ĐouŶtƌies ͚iŶ the 
eǀeŶt of aŶ eŵeƌgeŶĐǇ thƌeateŶiŶg͛.113 This was seen by Britain and the USA as an essential caveat 
to the revival of scientific activity in Germany. 
In short, the reconstruction of German science was simply the final phase in a varied 
strategic approach to this issue in the British zone. It offered many benefits, not least that it was 
inexpensive and could offer a route towards a more stable and democratic post-war society, 
essential as the cost to Britain of supporting its zone for the first two years of occupation was 
approximately £140 million, an amount it could ill-afford in its own dire economic state after the 
war.114 The only reservation which prevented this approach from being adopted as policy from the 
offset was that German science revived might contribute considerably to a German military 
resurgence. This concern was quickly swept away as the Soviet Union replaced Germany as the 
major threat to peace, and British interests, in Europe. Even as early as the summer of 1946, when 
the STRB were considering their policy towards German scientists, they expressed this view clearly: 
͚ǁe feel it is ŵost uŶlikelǇ iŶ ǀieǁ of Law No. 25 that those [scientists] left in Germany will become a 
future German war potential and our proposals are advocated solely with the object of denying 
them to others.͛115 Whatever the additional benefits, financial or otherwise, it was the need to 
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prevent these men from contributing in any way to the Soviet Union which truly drove the British 
support for the reconstruction of German science after the war. 
To conclude, it is clear to see that British approaches to German science followed a similar trajectory 
to other aspects of occupation policy, though there were often more drastic shifts between the 
different strategies adopted, marking science out as an area of greater contrast and complexity than 
the handling of other elements, such as politics or education. While Britain may have entered the 
occupation period with the intention to strip German science of any military capacity and to remove 
any trace of Nazi influence from its ranks, this crusade soon fell afoul of the exigencies of the period, 
most notably the rising threat of the Soviet Union. Stringent restrictions on the types of research 
which were permitted and the thorough denazification of scientific personnel were both seen to be 
incompatible with the new Cold War agenda, in which resisting Soviet imperialism and communist 
encroachment was top priority. Instead, the British sought to utilise the most important resources of 
German science for their own ends, facilitated through the exploitation process, while 
simultaneously preventing the Soviet Union from doing the same, as evidenced by the 
preponderance of ͚deŶial poliĐǇ͛. EǀeŶ afteƌ siǆ Ǉeaƌs of ǁaƌ, the desire to chastise, punish and 
extract reparations from Germany evaporated remarkably quickly, in the face of a new conflict 
looming on the horizon. 
This was not just true with regards to German science, but more widely too; there is little 
doubt that the occupation was entered into with a commitment to several moral missions – 
denazification, prosecuting war crimes, democratisation, re-education and many more – but the 
reality of the situation, not just the shift in international relations but also the considerable financial 
constraints of the period, meant that these noble aims had to be set aside in favour of simpler goals, 
such as making Germany self-sufficient and ensuring that its people did not starve or descend into 
anarchy.116 As a result, although when the war ended the British sought to comprehensively exploit, 
thoroughly demilitarise and tightly restrict German science, rapidly changing circumstances, not 
least the deepening enmity between East and West, pushed the occupation authorities towards 
pragmatism, which meant that British approaches to German science in the latter part of the post-
war period were far more practical, lenient and ultimately rehabilitative. While the Soviet Union 
remained a constant, growing threat throughout, the policies deemed most appropriate to face this 
new enemy changed often – in other words, perceived Cold War necessity both fuelled punitive and 
exploitative tactics in the early occupation period and then forced their decline in favour of 
reconstruction only a few years later. 
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